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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM "--1 
~~ u--J-
September 30, 1985 Conference ~-"\.., ~ ~ 
Surrmer List 21 , Sheet 1 o· ~ 4_ j:4l!;jfjiij:::=;~~ 
No. 84-1979 ~ y_ ~ _# 
PS FS Savings Bank, FSB elY Ce rt. to~Robi n- z:Z_£,_.., ,.., ...._/-
(former employer) w · son, Wri~__::...Northrop 
[DJ]) ~~~--~ L4-A.JfJ~J-. L .. -
v. ~~~~~ 
Vinson Federal/Civi 1  T1mely 
(Title VII plaintiff) ~~k_,p )-e) 
Jl~n-~. 
A..cfc.. 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge the CADC's cone usions that 
(1) resp alleged sufficient facts to state ~cogniza le Title VII 
i!'ADG J.cc~ 1"1....-f-
claim of sex discrimination; (2) any discriminatory ctivity by a 
/ supervisor is ~ble to t~e employer; and (3) , evid:nce ~f 
~c . ' 
resp' s voluntary participation in work place sexual activity is 
..__ - ---.. 
-,(.-
I 2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp met petr Taylor, vice-
president of petr PSFS and manager of one of its branch offices, 
and applied for a job. After filling out an application, resp 
was hired as a teller-trainee under Taylor's supervision. There-
---- {f) -~ -------cv fJY1- p fte r, she was p · .\ . to teller ad teller, and ultimately 
~ assistant branch manager. It is undisputed that resp's advance-
ment was solely a function of merit. Resp worked for petr for 
" It 
four years, when she took indefinite sick leave. Petr fired her ----
two months later for excessive use of that leave. 
"- ---------~ 
Resp then brought this action under Title VII, alleging sex-
'"' 
ual discrimination in the form of sexual harassment b ----. 
her original complaint, resp also alleged violations of the Fifth 
Amendment and 42 u.s.c. § 1985(2). These claims were abandoned 
on appeal. 
Conflicting testimony was presented at trial. Resp claimed 
that Taylor had made sexual advances to which she ultimately 
yielded because she feared that refusal would jeopardize her job. -.., 
She was then forced to have sex with Taylor both during and after 
I bu~r s and both on and off the bank premises. According 
to resp, Taylor would fondle her in front of other employees, 
make lewd remarks, and would follow her to the women's restroom 
and expose himself to her. He would also fondle other women em-
ployees. She also claimed that Taylor forcibly raped her on more -than one occasion. These activities stopped once resp began see-
ing her boyfriend. Resp never complained to any bank official, 
" - ::::;:>-r ~ e- ~ cq =>-: • filed a grievance, or reported being attacked to the police. 
-.j-
Taylor denied engaging in any of this activity, and claimed 
that resp brought such charges against him in retaliation for a 
business-related dispute. The bank asserted that it was unaware 
---, --
of any sexual misconduct or harassment by Taylor, and that if any 
such conduct was performed, ~ · by the 
bank. Finally, both Taylor and the bank presented evidence that 
resp often wore provocative clothing at work, entertained bizarre 
sexual fantasies, and continually volunteered intimate details of 
her sex life to other employees. 
h d . Ere ( , T e 1str1ct court ;r. Penn held for petrs. The court 
found that resp had not been subject to "quid pro quo" sexual 4)~ 
harassment (giving sex as a condition of employment) and could 
If resp did ~J..~ 
~~ 
engage in sexual relations with Taylor, their rel"~tionship was J...~ 
~ voluntary and not job-rel ated. The court al::;o found that !~AJ,. 
c:=: ' ~ -- ~ "'""·"'-t 
not come under the protection afforded by Title VII. 
the bank was without notice of any unlawful conduct, and could~- -- -·-- -------~ 
? . not be held liabl e. 
The CADC reversed and remanded. The court did not fault the 
district judge's finding of no "quid pro quo" sexual d iscri rnina-
tion, but noted that Title VII also provides a remedy for perva-
s~ , on-the-job sexual harassment, independent~f any t.,..hreatened 
loss of job benefits ("hostile environment" sexual harassment). --
( 
The CAOC also held that any 
attributable to the bank. 
---- ;=;, :::: ,..., 
d iscrirninatory activity by Taylor was 
Finally, the CA made two evidentiary 
rulings: (1) evidence of resp's "sartorial or whimsical procliv-
ities" was immaterial; and (2) on remand, resp should be allowed 
' ( to introduce evidence that Taylor sexually abused other female 
employees. 
The CAOC denied rehearing en bane. In dissent, J. Bork fo-----cused first on the panel's ruling that "a plaintiff's voluntari-
participating in a sexual relat' - with her supervi-
have no bearing on the pertinent inquiry in a sexual ha-
assment suit brought under Title VII." This holding "rigged" 
the rules of evidence "so that dalliance is automatically harass-
ment because no one is allowed to deny it." J. Bork also took 
exception with the panel's imposition of ~icarious liabilit ~ on 
the bank for the acts of a supervisor. The ~nel 's rule is in-
consistent with traditional tort law, and forces the employer 
~ ~-r-- ----=~ 
into becoming "an 1~r:- hat all relationships between supervi-
sors and employees re entirely asexual." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Fetrs argue that the CADC erred in exten ~ -
ing 'J'itle VII to cover "hostile environment" claims of sexual 
harassment. Although the CAOC relied on its own ruling in Bundy 
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (CAOC 1981) to support its conclusion, 
there is ro other case support for it, and this Court should de-
cide whether this kind of harassment constitutes discrimination 
for purposes of Title VII. 
If Title VII does apply to this type of suit, an employer 
cannot be held vicariously liable for the violation. This rule 
of absolute employer liability conflicts with the decisions of 
the CA3, Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (CA3 1983); 
Tompkins v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (CA3 
1977), the CA4, Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (CA4 1983), and the 
CAll, Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d '987 (CAll 1982). 
Finally, the CAOC's ruling that evidence of voluntary par-
ticipation in work-place sexual activity is immaterial to a Title 
VII claim also conflicts with the rule in other ci .. --!' See, 
e.g., Henson, supra, 682 F.2d at 903; Katz, supra, 709 F.2d at 
254 n.3. This holding precludes any defense on critical elements 
of a Title VII action. 
Resp contends that all sexual harassrnen t, whether "quid pro 
quo" or "hostile environment", is prohibited under Title VII, and 
every circuit to have addressed this issue agrees. It is also 
consistent with Title VII law to hold the employer strictly lia-
ble for acts of sexual harassment committed by supervisory per-
( sonnel. The alleged circuit split described by petrs simply does 
- not exist. Even if a "notice requirement" for employer liability 
is applied in this case, however, the facts clearly support the 
conclusion that the bank had both actual and constructive notice 
of Taylor's misconduct. 
Petrs misread the CAOC opinion on the voluntariness issue. 
The court correctly insisted that the complaining employee in a 
Title VI I action rnus t establish that the sexual advances corn-
plained of were un welcorn ed. The court did not hold, therefore 
that evidence of the plaintiff's voluntary sexual conduct was 
i nad miss i ble. 
4. DISCUSSION: ~trs' claim that Title VII does not afford --------a remedy for "hostile environment" sexual harassment is without 
foundation. In Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (CAOC 1981), the --------"'--
-6-
CAOC reasoned that the "conditions of employment" protected under 
' rritle VII "include the psychological and emotional work environ-
ment." rd. at 944, citing, ~gers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 
(CAS 1971), cert. denied, 406 u.s. 957 (1972). It followed, 
therefore, that "where an employer created or condoned a subs+-
tially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the 
complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result 
of the discrimination," Title VII had been violated. Id. at 943-
44 (emphasis in original). "Hostile environment" sexual harass-
ment thus amounts to sexual discrimination with respect to the 
"terms, conditions or privileges of employment" no less than 
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment. The court concluded that any 
other rule would allow an employer "sexually [to] harass a female 
employee with impunity by carefully stopping short of firing 
[her ] , or t a k i n g any other t an g i b 1 e ac t ions a g a i n s t he r in r e -
sponse to her resistance." Id. at 945. 
'J'h is reasoning has been endorsed by the only two other cir-
cuits (CA4 and CAll) which have considered this question. See 
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (CA4 1983); Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901, 903-905 (CAll 1982). This developnent 
is also consistent with EEOC Guidelines which provide that "[u]-
nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when .•• (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environ-
ment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). Given the uniform devel-
I 
opnent of this area of the law, the issue does not appear to cert 
worthy at this time. 
There is a circuit split, however, on the issue of an em-
J( ~ ;;;: ~,f\. 
ployer 's vicarious liabi lity " lin a "hostile environment" sexual 
'---
ha r a s s men t sui t . In the instant case, the CADC held that "Title 
-...., 7' 
VII imposes upon an employer without specific notice of sexual 
harassment by supervisory personnel responsibility for that spe-
V:: 
cies of discrimination." Op., App. at 12a. The~ Henson, 
however, held that "where the plaintiff seeks to hold the employ-
er responsible for the hostile environment created by the plain-
tiff's supervisor she must show that or 
should have known of the harassment in question and failed to 
take prompt remedial action." Henson, supra, 682 F.2d at 897. 
Katz is inapplicable on this point, as the plaintiff there 
alleged a "hostile environment" as the result of actions by her 
co-employees, not by supervisory personnel. Katz, supra, 709 
F.2d at 255. Such claims are governed by separate vicarious li-
ability regulations. Compare 29 C.F.R § 1604.ll(d) with Id. 
§ 16 04 .11 ( c ) . Similarly, nearly all of the cases cited by both 
petrs and resp are inapplicable to this discussion. 'r.hese cases 
involve "quid pro quo" claims of sexual harassment, not "hostile 
environment" clairrs. In that situation, the uniform rule is one 
of strict liability for employers for the acts of sexual harass-
ment committed by their supervisory personnel. See generally 




The different holdings by the CAll and the CADC reflect fun-
--------~~--- ...........---- ........... 
ability in Title VII actions. In Henson, the CAll distinguished 
between "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" sexual harass-
men t in fashioning its vicarious liability rule under traditional 
notions of respondeat superior. In "quid pro quo" cases, 
the supervisor relies upon his apparent or 
actual authority to extort sexual consideration 
fran an employee •... In that case, the supervi-
sor uses the means furnished to him by the em-
ployer to accomplish the prohibited purpose. 
Because the supervisor is acting within at least 
the apparent scope of the authority en trusted to 
him by the employer when he makes his employment 
decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to 
the source of his authority. 
rd. at 910. These circ1.111stances justify the imposition of abso-
- .,te vicarious liability for employers in "quid pro quo" sexual 
harassment cases under Title VII. 
In "hostile environment" claims, however, "[tJhe capacity of 
any person to create a hostiJe or offensive environment is not 
necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority 
which the employer confers upon that individual." rd. The CAll 
reasoned that, by creating a hostile environment, the supervisor 
acts outside the scope of his authority, and thus "[h) is conduct 
cannot automatically be imputed to the employer any more so than 
can the conduct of an ordinary employee." Id. 
The CADC completely rejected this reasoning. The court re- ci#OC:. 
fused to rely on the tort concept of respondeat superior in con-
struing Title VII cases. The court found that common-law tort 
concepts are rot applicable, without clear Congressional authori-
-:7-
' zation, to interpret a statutory scheme designed to cure a spe-
cific evil. Op., App. at 18a-19a, citing NLRB v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 322 u.s. 111,124-125 (1944). On a broader level, 
the court determined that "confining liability, as the common law 
would do, to situations in which a supervisor acted within the 
scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous 
result that employers would become accountable only if they ex-
pl i ci tly require or consciously allow their s upe rvi sor s to molest 
women employees." Id. at 19a-20a. An employer could thus ensure 
his immunity fran claims for which he is unaware "by the simple 
expedient of looking the other way," a rule which provides an 
incentive for employers rot to take a more active role in freeing 
the work place from illegal sex discrimination. 
Relyin., instead on the language of Title VII, the court not-
'-- ed that in ·quid pro quo" cases, the uniform rule was to impose 
strict liability on employers independent of their knowledge of 
the alleged sexual harassment. Id. at 15a, quoting 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11 (c). The court saw ro reason not to apply this rule to 
all instances where Title VII applies to charges of sexual dis-
crimination, in the same manner as adopted for "transgressions 
arising out of racial or religious discrimination." Id. at 16a. 
The conflict between the CAll and the CADC is thus signifi-
cant, ooth in reasoning and in the results achieved. This case --- ~ ..-. 
provides a proper vehicle for resolving this conflict, as it is 
clear that resp can only prevail under the strict liability ap-
proach adopted by the CAre. Despite resp's contentions to the 
contrary, there appears to be little, if any, evidence to indi-
-.L v-
I cate that the petr bank had either actual or constructive knowl-
j 
edge of petr Taylor's conduct to justify 'imposing liability under 
the CAll's reasoning. This issue is cert worthy. 
The CAOC's evidentiary rulings are confusing, but rot cert 
In that part of the opinion, the court was explaining 
the difference between "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" 
sexual harassment, am j ndicating that the district court had not 
properly considered resp's claims under the latter theory. The 
court found that "[i] f the evidence war ran ted a finding of 
sexual harassment [under the "hostile environment" standard, 
resp's] 'voluntariness' had no materiality whatsoever." Op.' 
App. at 9a. 
This seemingly absolute language, however, is undercut lat-
er in the opinion where the court roted: 
In deterrnin.tng the appropriateness of attribu-
tion, ero ugh specificity rnu st be irnpa r ted to 'ha-
rassment' to filter out personal relationships 
that are rot products of employment-related in-
ti rni da t ion. For purposes of this case , we a re 
well-served by the criteria reflected in the EEOC 
Guidelines. The touchstone of these cr i te ria is 
that sexual advances rnus t be un ~1 come, and rnus t 
in some way amount to an explicit or implicit 
term cr condition of employment in the sense 
e it he r of j o b status or w or k en vir o nrn en t . 
Id. at 17a n. 68, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a). This language 
implies that an employer may still defend a Title VII charge of 
sexual harassment by showing that the sexual advances were not 
"un ~lcorne" (i.e. , that such advances were wel corned by the ern-
ployee) • See Henson, supra, 682 F. 2d at 903. Given the internal 
inconsistency on this issue within the opinion, the Court should 
-.L .L -
I allCM the CAOC to interpret its own holding on thjs issue before 
expressing a view on its appropriateness~ 
5. RECOMMENDA'l'ION: I recommend granting cert on the issue 
of supervisory liability for "hostile environment" sexual dis-• t.__: c::::!'L'----.___________.. -------... 
crirninatiort Title VII. I reco:rrrrnend denial on the other 
issues. 
There is a response. 
September 1, 198 5 Schultz Opin in petn. 
March 18, 1986 
PSFS GINA-POW 
84-1979 PSFS Savings Bank Associatioin v. Mechelle Vinson 
{CADC) 
To be argued March 25 
MEMO TO BOB: 
This is a case in which CADC (Robinson, Wright, and 
Northrop (district judge)), found petitioner guilty of a 
Title VII violation because of sex discrimination. 
Although the petition and various briefs state the 
questions somewhat differently, I think the amicus brief 
by the SG perhaps best identifies the questions presented. 
I will not, in this uniquely brief memo, identify the 
questions in full detail. Rather, it may be helpful to 
you if I state first my tentative views: 
1. CADC held that where unwelcome sexual advances 
have been made by a supervisor to subordinate female 
employees the result may be an "offensive work 
environment", that constitutes employee discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. There is a split of authority on 
this question. I am inclined to agree, however, with the 
SG (actually EEOC) that where there is adequate proof of 
such an offensive working environment, there is a 
violation of Title VII. On the basis of my reading of the 
findings of the DC, I do not think there was adequate 
proof of any such environment in this case. 
2. The second question identified by the SG also is 
a factual one. I have read the findings of fact 
explicitly made in a rather c areful opinion by the DC . At 
least on their face, these facts support the judgment of 
the DC in favor of petitioner, and dismissal of 
respondent's complaint with prejudice. The DC found, in 
addition to other facts, the following: 
• 
( i) • Respondent's promotions were based on merit 
alone, and not as a result of sexual favors to her 
supervisor Taylor or anyone else. 
( i i) • If the plaintiff and Taylor engaged in sexual 
relationships, "that relationship was a voluntary one by 
plaintiff having nothing to do with her continued 
employment at Capital or her advancements or promotions at 
that institution." 
(iii). Raises, bonuses and promotions were determined 
by officials of the Association, and not by Taylor who 
only made writ ten recommendations. Moreover, throughout 
respondent's employment, she received the usual and 
customary increases in salary, bonuses and promotions "on 
the basis of merit". 
(iv). The petitioner's Employee Manual provides a 
grievance procedure whereby any employee may state a 
grievance and have it resolved, if not by a supervisor, 
then by the division head or the president. 
(v). Respondent "never filed" an informal or formal 






"expressed policy of 
one of non-discrimination 
the defendant 
in employment 
(vii) • "No female employment of petitioner 'filed an 
EEOC complaint or formal grievance procedure charging 
defendant Taylor with sexual harrassment during the period 
in question'"; and finally 
(viii). Respondent was "not the victim of 
of 
sexual 
sexual harrassment and was not the victim 
discrimination" during her employment. 
Although I must reread the opinion of CADC, and also 
that of Judge Bork (with which I generally agree), I do 
not think the court of appeals expressly found any of 
these findings to be clearly erroneous. Rather, more 
generally, it considered the entire scope of such evidence 
to be irrelevant or inadmissible. For reasons certainly 
not clear to me (particularly in view of some 
inconsistencies in its opinion}, CADC seem to have 
accepted respondent's opinion testimony that there was an 
"offensive working environment" and that once this finding 
was made, the facts found by the DC were irrelevant. 
(Bob: I would particularly like your comments on this}. 
3. Finally, perhaps the most important question is 
whether (Bob: Ginny tells me the remainder of my 
dictation did not record. I will not try to repeat it. 
My tentative view is to reverse, but I remain open to 




No.84-1979 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
~~~ 
TO BE ARGUED: Tuesday, March 25, 1986 ~i::() 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Whether creation of an "offensive working environment" inde-
pendent of any loss of promotion or other pecuniary harm states a 
cause of action for sex discrimination under Title VII. Whether 
an employer is liable under Title VII for sexual harassment by 
supervisors which create a discriminatory working environment 
even where the employer is unaware of such conduct. Whether evi-
dence of complainant's dress, conduct, and proclivities along 
page 2. 
with the voluntar iness of her acti viti es are admissible in de-, 
fense of a Title VII claim. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1974 appellant Mechelle Vinson obtained a job at appellee 
Capital City Federal Savings Bank through Sidney L. Taylor, who 
was a vice president of appellee. Respondent began her employ-
ment as a teller-trainee, and thereafter was promoted successive-
ly to teller, head teller, and finally to assistant branch manag-
er. Respondent worked in the branch for four years, after which 
--~ 
she took indefinite sick-leave which ultimately led to her dis-
missal for excessive use of that leave. 
Respondent then brought an action against Taler and the 
bank, alleging that she had been victimized by sex discrimination 
in the form of sexual harassment by Taylor in violation of Title 
VII. At trial, the evidence bearing on Taylor's behavior towards 
Vinson was sharply contrasting. Respondent claimed that Taylor 
and Vinson had sex numerous times both at the bank and away from 
it, with respondent going along merely out of fear of reprisal. 
Respondent testified to several other sexually demeaning, and 
sometimes violent, acts on the part of Taylor directed towards 
respondent as well as other women. Taylor denied that he ever 
had any sexual relations with respondent; he claimed that these 
charges were aired in retaliation for a work-related dispute. 
Review of this case is hampered somewhat by the unorthodox -
form of opinion used by the DC. Rather than making clearly la-
beled finding of facts, and then applying the facts found to the 
law as it understood it, the opinion discusses one legal issue 
page -'• 
relevant here, which is whether the employer had notice of the 
~ ' 
harassment. The DC found that the employer had no notice of the -----......... 
harassment at issue. Specifically, it rejected respondent's 
claim that notice to Mr. Taylor a supervisor, was notice to the 
bank. Because it held there was no notice to the bank, the DC 
concluded that the bank could not be held liable for the acts of 
Taylor. The DC then goes on to make additional findings of fact 
which are unrelated to any legal discussion found in the opinion. 
Of those findings, the following are arguably relevant to this 
case here: Respondent's advancement was achieved solely on the 
basis of merit; raises and bonuses were not determined by Taylor, 
and, in any event, respondent received the usual amounts of 
these; respondent never availed herself of any bank procedures to 
/ 
complain about the harassment. In addition, the DC found 
If the plaintiff and Taylor did engage in an inti-
mate or sexual relationship during the time of plain-
tiff's employment with Capital, that relationship was a 
vo~y one by plaintiff having nothing to do with 
her continued employment at Capital or her advancement 
or promotions at that institution. 
As pointed out by amici AFL-CIO, et al. this latter finding 
is somewhat remarkable in that it simply avoids a central credi-
bili ty issue of the case, which is whether such a relationship 
took place, and the finding comports with neither the story of 
Taylor--who claimed that no relationship took place, nor that of 
respondent who claimed that only an unwelcome one took place.l 
lAFL-CIO point out that the CA was possibly unable to review 
this fact as clearly erroneous because it did not have a total 
transcript, due apparently to the fact that the DC denied 
respondent's IFP request for a transcript. 
page q. 
What made the Court of Appeals' even job more difficult, of 
course, is that the DC never bothered to give its understanding 
of what the applicable law is in a sexual harassment case. These 
"findings of fact" are merely followed by the conclusory state-
ment that no Title VII violation occurred here. 
v/ 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It noted that Title VII 
claims come in two varieties: there is the garden variety "quid 
~ .E!..Q" claim in which a plaintiff asserts that sexual favors 
were required in order for the plaintiff to retain a job, achieve 
a promotion, etc. This is not such a case. Rather, the CA ex-
plained that respondent's claim was one for for sexual harass-
ment. In a sexual harassment case, the issue is whether Taylor -
"created or condoned a substantially ~ iscriminatory work environ-
"'-
ment, regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any -
tangible job benefits as a result of the discrimination." App. 
7a, citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-944 (CADC 1981). 
The CA noted that the DC did not undertake a determination on 
whether a Title VII violation of this nature occurred, and that a 
remand was proper on this issue.2 TheCA added, however, that ?? 
the voluntariness of respondent's behavior in a sexual harassment 
case was immaterial. 
~
It further mentioned in a footnote, that 
evidence of respondent's dress and personal fantasies "had no 
place in this litigation." In addition, it concluded that the DC 
2of course, this is also understandable in that Bundy had not 
been decided when the DC ruled, and this case was so long on 
appeal (3 years from argument to panel decision) that the law 
clarified significantly. 
page ~. 
had erred in not permitting responde~t to elicit evidence from 
other women of how Taylor had treated them. 
The CA also reversed with respect to employer liability on 
the notice issue. The CA held that employers must answer for 
sexual harassment of any subordinate by any supervising superior. 
First, Title VII expressly defines an employer as including the 
employer's agents. Second, it relied very slightly on some legis-
lative history. Third, The EEO Guidelines support such a view. 
Finally, it noted that neither the statutory language nor its 
legislative history suggested that sex discrimination should be 
treated any differently from racial or religious discrimination, 
and "the case law in these latter areas establishes beyond cavil 
that an employer is chargeable with Title VII violations occa-
sioned by discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel" App. 
16a (quotation omitted). In addition, supervisors are not limited 
to those who can hire, promote, or fire; rather, "the ability to 
direct employees in their work, to evaluate their performances 
and to recommend personnel actions carries attendant power to 
coerce, intimidate and harass." 
II. DISCUSSION 
I am frankly somewhat surprised that the SG found this a 
case worth participating in. Judge Bork was clearly correct that 
the evidentiary rulings of the CADC were wrong, but I think any ? 
subsequent cour that out. The "strict li-
ability" issue is a bit of a tempest in a teapot given that in 
cases where there has been no firing, demotion, etc, the most a 
victorious plaintiff can receive is an injunction against the 
page 6. 
employer telling it to correct the o~fensive environment. This 
is not a case that leaves employers open to large compensatory or 
punitive damage claims, as they are forbidden by Title VII. Fi-
nally, whether Ms. Vinson loses or wins here or on remand with ~ 
respect to the facts hardly seems worth the SG's--or this 
Court's--time. 
A. The existence of a cause of action for harassment. 
You indicated in your memo to file that you have no trouble 
concluding, as the SG does, that a cause of action exists where 
actions of supervisors create an "offensive work environment." I 
agree with this, and believe it is supported by the plain lan-
guage of Title VII, and the purpose behind it. I will add simply 
that petitioner's argument that Title VII was meant to remedy 
merely tangible "economic" harms such as loss of job, etc, does 
not support its view that the creation of an offensive work envi-
~~ ronment should not state a Title VII violation. Clearly, were a 
I( 
significant number of employers to permit their workplaces to 
become sexually, racially, or religiously offensive, there is no 
doubt that, as a practical matter, jobs would be foreclosed to 
the offended who would be unwilling to submit themselves to such 
terms of employment--and Title VII expressly prohibits, inter 
alia, discrimination in terms or conditions of employment. Ac-
ceptance of petitioner's view would mean that all sorts of sexual 
harassment could be carried on with impunity as long as the sub-
ject is never fired, demoted, etc. That is silly. Finally, there 
is absolutely no reason for d' sexual harassment from 
racial or religious har 
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of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 {CAll 1~82); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 
F.2d 934, 943-44 {CADC 1981). 
In the event the Court agrees that sexual harassment states 
a claim under Title VII, I believe that the EEO Guidelines state 
an acceptable definition: "unwelcome sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature constitute sexual harassment when", inter alia, "such 
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment," 29 u.s.c. 
§1604.11. 
B. Employer Liability 
The important issue in this case, I think, is whether an 
employer can be held liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor 
absent notice to the employer of such harassment. Certain briefs 
argue that this issue need not be reached until there is a find-
ing of 1 iabil i ty. I disagree because a decision that there can 
be no liability imputed to the bank would preclude the necessity 
of a remand on the factual issues in the case. 
The petr's main argument is that without notice to the em-
ployer there can be no finding of intent. That begs the question 
because the issue here is which representative of the company 
needs to have the intent in order to find the company 1 iable. 
The SG takes petr' s side on this issue beginning with the idea 
that the Act uses the term "agent," but noting that an "agent" is 
deemed one only insofar as he acts within the scope of his au-
thority. The SG, however, makes two critical admissions. First, 
he admits that agency principles are not carried wholesale into 
Title VII analysis. Second, he admits that where a supervisor 
fires a worker for sexual reasons, the employer is liable regard-
less of its awareness of the behavior, even though a strong argu-
ment can be made that firings for sexual reasons are beyond the 
scope of the agent's authority and therefore the employer should 
not be liable. Therefore, I find the SG' s argument resting on 
the term agency to be weak. Just as a supervisor is the employ-
er' s agent when he is empowered to hire, fire, etc. , he would 
seem to be no less the employer's agent when it comes to dealing 
with subordinates or creating a working atmosphere. See Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 913 (CAll 1982) (Clark, J., dis-
senting). The SG proposes the following rule that asks whether 
procedures were available to an employee and whether they were 
utilized, and the company was "reasonably responsive to the com-
plaint." Only if this procedure was followed or there is actual 
knowledge could the employer be found liable. 
I recommend that you reject the SG's view on notice. First, 
--------------------------------------------
it is inconsistent with Title VII law in any other area. The SG 
admits that if this were a quid ~ ~ case the bank would be 
liable for the supervisor's activity here. If it were a race or 
religious atmosphere case liability would apparently be imputed 
to the employer. 3 Second, the SG makes no attempt to justify 
3I do not rely too heavily on thi argument. Several cases 
from the race area involve firi s, thus they are not analogous 
to a case in which there the of ense is limited to creating an 
offensive working environment. In addition, those cases that do 




special treatment for sex discrimination cases except to say that 
enforcement is difficult because a lot of sexual relationships 
are not abusive. That does not justify a policy that leads to 
excusing a hostile working environment in cases in which the vic-
tims are truly offended or abused. In addition, even if it is a 
good pol icy, the SG should address those concerns to Congress, 
because the statute this Court is asked to interpret indicates in 
no way that sexual harassment claims are to be treated different 
from other Title VII claims. Indeed Congress, indicated that 
"discrimination against women is no less serious than other pro-
hibited forms of discrimination." s. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 7 (1971), quoted in Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 606 
(CA7 1985). Third, the SG's fear that the CADC's rule will lead 
..::..__ 
to interference in private matters on the part of employers seems 
misplaced. Courts can separate abusive situations from non-
abusive ones, which would have been evident here if the District 
Court had explained itself properly. Fourth, the CADC' s rule ____. 
does not open up employers to endless financial liability. In 
cases in which there has been no firing, failure to promote, or 
demotion, the remedy is simply injunctive. Fifth, the SG's rule 
is, in effect, an exhaustion requirement nowhere suggested in the 
statute, and one which, I think, has the potential for creating 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous page) 
yet ruled on liability for the acts of a supervisor in the areas 
of race and religion in harassment cases. I would simply suggest 
that there is no reason to distinguish sex cases from race or 
religion cases with respect to liability for the acts of a 
supervisor. 
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endless confusion on the meaning of li~bility. By separating the 
employer from its supervisors, it would be unclear whose acts 
could constitute a Title VII violation.4 Sixth, a rule requir--
ing notice in such situations causes needless confusion in aneth-
er respect. A "constructive discharge" case is a hybrid of 
sorts. Such a claim is that harassment got so bad that the 
claimant was forced to quit--not that she was fired due to fail-
ure to acquiesce. I can see no reason for imputing liability to 
the employer in a case where a worker is wrongfully fired--an 
imposition of liability on the employer with which the SG agrees-
and not imputing it where harassment is so bad one has no 
choice but to quit. Once such a distinction is rejected, it re-
quires little to say that there is no reason to wait until a sit-
uation gets so bad that an employee has to quit before an injunc-
tion can issue against the employer. Seventh, the SG's statement 
that the approach in the brief is simply an elaboration of the 
approach taken by the EEOC seems flatly wrong. Those regulations ---provide, as pointed out by the CADC: 
"Applying general Title VII principles, an employ-
er is responsible for its acts and those of its 
agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual 
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts com-
plained of were authorized or even forbidden by the 
employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or 
4For example, the SG's brief argues that "the gravamen of a 
'hostile environment' claim is that the employer has improperly 
tolerated a sexually discriminatory atmosphere." SG's Brief at 
29. Accepting that as true would mean that after notice to the 
Bank here, the focus of a lawsuit would be on how the bank acted, 
rather than on how Mr. Taylor acted prior to and subsequent to 
the notice. There is no reason to complicate a determination of 
liability to this degree. 
should have 
§l604.ll(c) 





Finally, as respondent points out, if the Bank is not lia-
ble, and if the individual's liability is unclear because he is 
not,~ an individual, the employer for purposes of Title VII, 
then some acts of discrimination go unrernedied. 
C. The "voluntariness" finding of the DC and Evidentiary 
Issues 
Recall that the CA stated that the issue in a sexual harass-
rnent case is whether T~or "created or condoned a substantially 
--- -· --- -- ~ - ,...-, - J( ___ ._ - · ~
di scr irni natory work en vi ronrnent, regardless of whether the corn- '-- - ----
- ~--------------------~ 
proper course was to remand on this issue. I do not think that 
the stark, unexplained, ambiguous finding of the DC that if re-
spondent and Taylor engaged in sexual relations, they were volun-
~ tary, can possibly stand as dispositive of the sexual harassment 
/ claim. The CA stated that under Bundy, the DC was to determine 
whether respondent was subjected to "sexually stereotyped in-
sults,""derneaning propositions" or "unwelcorned sexual advances" 
that poisoned the work environment. The EEOC guidelines consider 
in addition "other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture." 
the issue whether two people had a "voluntary" relationship, and 
without analysis of these issues a DC has simply not evaluated a 
claim of harassment. Further, it simply is not clear to me what 
page .L-'· 
"voluntary" means here, and in light of the fact that the legal 
nature of a sexual harassment claim was not clear when the DC 
ruled, and in light of the fact that the CA had only a partial 
transcript and may have felt constrained in overturning this as 
clearly erroneous, I see no reason to interfere with its remand 
determination. Upholding the remand changes nothing with respect 
to Title VII law, but does ensure that DC's do their job right, 
and that this case is evaluated properly. The Government's brief 
here goes to some lengths to argue that if this Court examines 
the record as a whole there is no way that a claim of discrimina-
tion was stated; if that is so, the DC on remand will be able to 
determine that quickly enough, and I cannot begin to understand 
why this Court should examine the record on this issue. I note, 
in passing, that the Court did not grant cert on the issue of 
whether the voluntariness finding precludes a finding of liabil-
ity here. On a question that is presented, I disagree with the 
CA that "voluntariness had no materiality whatsoever." Simply, 
as an evidentiary matter such a statement is silly. The Court 
can save for another day, the precise way that "voluntariness" 
might fit into a harassment claim, but surely such evidence must 
be admissible to explain who might have had a greater part in 
"causing" the discriminatory atmosphere. Similarly, I think the 
CA was wrong that evidence of respondent's dress and discussions 
with other workers "had no place in this litigation.~_'' Again, it 
seems an elementary point that admitting evidence in no way im-
plies that such evidence will be accorded great weight or will 
determine the outcome. Such evidence is surely relevant to de-
page .L,j. 
ciding the nature of the work environment and how it got 
created.s 
D. Mootness and Respondent's Suggestion to DIG 
I am not persuaded by respondent's argument, as well as the 
argument of some amici, that the writ of certiorari should be 
dismissed as improvidently granted. The case presents legal 
questions_, --·-- -· -- ---......_.--and whatever factual problems exist can be cleared up ~-- -- ..__. ~ ..... 
on re~d. A greate~on~~ whether the case i~mooS Since 
the DC twice did not allow respondent to amend her complaint to 
make a constructive discharge claim, and respondent no longer 
works for the bank, it is not clear to me what relief she could 
get if she wins. Although the DC opinion is again not crystal 
clear, it is clear enough that it found that the firing was not 
sexually motivated; therefore there could be no back pay, rein-
~ -
statement, etc. Amicus AFL-CIO suggests that on remand the DC 
could still allow an amendment to the complaint so it is at least 
uncertain at this time what remedy could follow. In addition, 
several cases have made the curious remark that someone could get 
"nominal damages" and "attorneys' fees." For reasons flowing 
from this Court's circulated decisions in Bender and Diamond rel-
SI think, however, that the<:A was clearly correct in ruling 
that evidence tending to show harassment of other women working 
alongside respondent is pla1n y re evan 1n a arassme 't. } 
As the CA stated "Even a woman who was never herself the object 
of harassment might have a Title VII claim is she were fo ced to 
work in an atmosp ere 1n whic sue harassment was pervasive. 
Th , en, o e, wa ano er way 1n w 1c e ailed to 
properly assess the environmental issue. This issue is not 
before the Court, and the DC on remand could, of course, taken 
new evidence on it. 
7 
i-Jctge .1.'!. 
ative to attorneys' fees and standing, I do not believe that at-
torneys' fees prevent the case from becoming moot. With respect 
to "nominal damages," I have examined the several cases that seem 
to suggest that they would be possible, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 
F.2d 251, 253 n. 1 (CA4 1983), and I agree with amicus AFL-CIO 
that "the question of whether such relief should be permitted is 
at least a substantial legal question in its own right, never 
decided by the Court and not yet addressed in this case by the 
lower courts." AFL-CIO Amicus, at 24. My own view is that such a 
remedy is probably not available because courts are not empowered 
to grant remedies not provided for in the statute in question. I 
think you may want to ask about mootness at oral argument. I 
probably come down agreeing with the AFL-CIO that "it will not be 
evident until after the remand whether there is~ relief avail-
able to Vinson if she prevails on the merits." It is conceiv-
able, though not likely, that the DC will now let Vinson add her 
constructive discharge claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As pointed out in the brief of the Women's Bar Associations, 
sexual harassment at the work place has been shown by various 
reliable studies to be a serious problem in this country. That is 
apparently why Congress acted. I recommend that the decision of 
the CADC be affirmed insofar as it holds that sexual harassment 
states a claim under Title VII, and that the supervisor's acts 
/ r / 
1 C page ~~. 
can be imputed to the employer. I recommend reversal on the two 
J --~ I 
evidentiary points. 
~ . . _,. 
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: __ APR __ !_J_ 1986 __ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1979 
MERITOR SAVINGS BANK, FSB, PETITIONER v. 
MECHELLE VINSON ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1986] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents important questions concerning claims 
of workplace "sexual harassment" brought under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 
I 
In 1974, respondent Michelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a 
vice president of what is now petitioner Meritor Savings 
Bank (the bank) and manager of one of its branch offices. 
When respondent asked whether she might obtain employ-
ment at the bank, Taylor gave her an application, which she 
completed and returned the next day; later that same day 
Taylor called her to say that she had been hired. With Tay-
lor as her supervisor, respondent started as a teller-trainee, 
and thereafter was promoted to teller, head teller, and assist-
ant branch manager. She worked at the same branch for 
four years, and it is undisputed that her advancement there 
was based on merit alone. In September ·1978, respondent 
notified Taylor that she was taking sick leave for an indefinite 
period. On November 1, 1978, the bank discharged her for 
excessive use of that leave. 
Respondent brought this action against Taylor and the 
bank, claiming that during her four years at the bank she had 









2 MERITOR SAVINGS BANK v. VINSON 
in violation of Title VII. She sought injunctive relief, com-
pensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank, 
and attorney's fees. 
At the 11-day bench trial, the parties presented conflicting 
testimony about Taylor's behavior during respondent's em-
ployment.* Respondent testified that during her proba-
tionary period as a teller-trainee, Taylor treated her in a fa-
therly way and made no sexual advances. Shortly 
thereafter, however, he invited her out to dinner and, during 
the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a motel to 
have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of wha
1
t 
she described as fear of losing her job she eventually agreed. 
According to respondent, Taylor thereafter made repeated-
demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, 
both during and after business hours; she estimated that over 
the next several years she had intercourse with him some 40 
or 50 times. In addition, respondent testified that Taylor 
fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the 
women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed him-
self to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. 
These activities ceased after 1977, respondent stated, when 
she started going with a steady boyfriend. 
Respondent also testified that Taylor touched and fondled 
other women employees of the bank, and she attempted to 
call witnesses to support this charge. But while some sup-
porting testimony apparently was admitted without objec-
tion, the District Court did not allow her "to present whole-
sale evidence of a pattern and practice relating to sexual 
advances to other female employees in her case in chief, but 
advised her that she might well be able to present such evi-
dence in rebuttal to the defendants' cases." Vinson v. Tay-
lor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 37, 38-39, n. 1 (D DC 
1980). Respondent did not offer such evidence in rebuttal. 
•Like the Court of Appeals, this Court was not provided a compete 
transcript of the trial. We therefore rely largely on the District Court's 
opinion for the summary of the relevant testimony. 
84-197~PINION 
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Finally, Respondent testified that because she was afraid of 
Taylor she never reported his harassment to any of his super-
visors and never attempted to use the bank's complaint 
procedure. ' 
Taylor denied respondent's allegations of sexual activity, 
testifying that he never fondled her, never made suggestive 
remarks to her, never engaged in sexual intercourse with her 
and never asked her to do so. He contended instead that re-
spondent made her accusations in response to a business-re-
lated dispute. The bank also denied respondent's allegations 
and asserted that any sexual harassment by Taylor was un-
known to the bank and engaged in without its consent or 
approval. 
The District Court denied relief, but did not resolve the 
conflicting testimony about the existence of a sexual relation-
ship between respondent and Taylor. It found instead that 
"If [respondent] and Taylor did engage in an intimate 
or sexual relationship during the time of [respondent's] 
employment with [the bank], that relationship was a vol-
untary one having nothing to do with her continued em-
ployment at [the bank] or her advancement or promo-
tions at that institution." Id., at 42 (footnote omitted). 
The court ultimately found that respondent "was not the vic-
tim of sexual harassment and was not the victim of sexual dis-
crimination" while employed at the bank. I d., 43. 
Although it concluded that respondent had not proved a vi-
olation of Title VII, the District Court nevertheless went on 
to address the bank's liability. After noting the bank's ex-
press policy against discrimination, and finding that neither 
respondent nor any other employee had ever lodged a com-
plaint about sexual harassment by Taylor, the court ulti-
mately concluded that "the bank was without notice and can-
not be held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor." Id., 
at 42. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of .Columbia Circuit 
reversed. 753 F. 2d 141 (1985). Relying on its earlier hold-
84-1979-0PINION 
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ing in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F. 2d 934 (1981), decided after 
the trial in this case, the court stated that a violation of Title 
VII may be predicated on either of two types of sexual ha-
rassment: harassment that involves the conditioning of con-
crete employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment 
that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile 
or offensive working environment. The court drew addi-
tional support for this position from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985), which set out these 
two types of sexual harassment claims. Believing that "Vin-
son's grievance was clearly of the [hostile environment] 
type," and that the District Court had not considered 
whether a violation of this type had occurred, the court con-
cluded that a remand was necessary. 
The court further concluded that the District Court's find-
ing that any sexual relationship between respondent and 
Taylor "was a voluntary one" did not obviate the need for a 
remand. "[U]ncertain as to precisely what the [district] 
court meant" by this finding, the Court of Appeals held that if 
the evidence otherwise showed that "Taylor made Vinson's 
toleration of sexual harassment a condition of her employ-
ment," her voluntariness "had no materiality whatsoever." 
753 F. 2d, at 146. The court then surmised that the District 
Court's finding of voluntariness might have been based on 
"the voluminous testimony regarding respondent's dress and 
personal fantasies," testimony that the Court of Appeals be-
lieved "had no place in this litigation." I d., at 146, n. 36. 
As to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that an 
employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced 
by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew 
or should have known about the misconduct. The court re-
lied chiefly on Title VII's definition of "employer" to include 
"any agent of such a person," 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), as well 
as on the EEOC guidelines. The court held that a supervi-
sor is an "agent" of his employer for Title VII purposes, even 
84-1979-0PINION 
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if he lacks authority to hire, fire, or promote, since "the mere 
existence-or even the appearance-of a significant degree of 
influence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the 
opportunity to impose on employees." 753 F. 2d, at 150. 
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals re-
versed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. A subsequent suggestion for 
rehearing en bane was denied, with three judges dissenting. 
760 F. 2d 1330 (1985). We granted certiorari, 474 U. S.-
(1985), and now affirm but for different reasons. 
II 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer ... to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The prohibition against dis-
crimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last 
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives. 110 
Cong. Rec. 2,577-2,584 (1964). The principal argument in 
opposition to the amendment was that "sex discrimination" 
was sufficiently different from other types of discrimination 
that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment. See 
110 Cong. Rec. 2,577 (1964) (Statement of Rep. Celler quot-
ing letter from United States Department of Labor); id., at 
2,584 (statement of Rep. Green). This argument was de-
feated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left 
with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the 
the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on "sex." 
Respondent argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that 
unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or hos-
tile working environment violate Title VII. Without ques-
tion, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate be-
cause of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 
"discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex. Petitioner apparently 
84-197~0PINION 
6 MERITOR SAVINGS BANK v. VINSON 
does not challenge this proposition. It contends instead that 
in prohibiting discrimination with respect to "compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment, Congress 
was concerned with what petitioner describes as "tangible 
loss" of "an economic character," not "purely psychological 
aspects of the workplace environment." Brief for the Peti-
tioner 30-31. In support of this claim petitioner observes 
that in both the legislative history of Title VII and this 
Court's Title VII decisions, the focus has been on tangible, 
economic barriers erected by discrimination. 
We reject petitioner's view. First, the language of Title 
VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. 
The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" 
evinces a Congressional intent " 'to strike at the entire spec:" 
trum of disparate treatment of men and women'" in employ-
ment. City of Los Angeles Department ofWater and Power 
v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1977), quoting Sprogis 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). 
Petitioner has pointed to nothing in the Act to suggest that 
Congress contemplated the limitation urged here. 
Second, in 1980 the EEOC issued guidelines specifying 
that "sexual harassment," as there defined, is a form of sex 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. As an "adminis-
trative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency," 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 433-434 (1971), 
these guidelines, "'while not controlling upon the courts by 
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience 
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance,'" General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U. S. 125, 141-142 (1976), quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). The EEOC guide-
lines fully support the view that harassment leading to non-
economic injury can violate Title VII. 
In defining "sexual harassment," the guidelines first de-
scribe the kinds of workplace conduct that may be actionable 
under Title VII. These include "[u]nwelcome sexual ad-
84-1979---0PINION 
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vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature." 29 CFR § 1604.1l(a). Rele-
vant to the charges at issue in this case, the guidelines 
provide that such sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited 
"sexual harassment," whether or not it is directly linked to 
the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where "such 
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive work environment." 
§ 1604.11(a)(3). 
In concluding that so-called "hostile environment" (i. e., 
non quid pro quo) harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC 
drew upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC 
precedent holding that Title VII affords employees the right 
to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insult. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 
(1980). Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 U. S. 957 (1972), was apparently the first case to 
recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work 
environment. In Rogers, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that a Hispanic complainant could establish a 
Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer cre-
ated an offensive work environment for employees by giving 
discriminatory service to its Hispanic clientele. The court 
explained that an employee's protections under Title VII ex-
tend beyond the economic aspects of employment: 
"[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which 
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creat-
ing a working environment heavily charged with ethnic 
or racial discrimination. . . . One can readily envision 
working environments so heavily polluted with dis-
crimination as to destroy completely the emotional and 
psychological stability of minority group workers . . . . " 
454 F. 2d, at 238. 
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Courts applied this principle to harassment based on race, 
e. g., Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. 
Louis, 549 F. 2d 506, 514-515 (CA8), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 
819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F. 2d 169, 176 
(CADC 1976), religion, e. g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 
F. Supp. 157 (SD Ohio 1976), and national origin, e. g., 
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F. 2d 87, 
88 (CA8 1977). Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile 
environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment 
should not be. likewise prohibited. The guidelines thus ap-
propriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the 
existing caselaw. 
1 
Since the guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly. 
held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation 
of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has 
created a hostile or abusive work environment. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit wrote in Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 902 (1982): 
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offen-
sive environment for members of one sex is every bit the 
arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that 
racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a re-
quirement that a man or woman run a guantlet of sexual 
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work 
and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting 
as the harshest of racial epithets." 
Accord, Katz v. Dole, 709 F. 2d 251, 254-255 (CA4 1983); 
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F. 2d, at 943-944; Zabkowicz v. West 
Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (ED Wise. 1984). 
Of course, as the courts in both Rogers and Henson recog-
nized, not all workplace conduct that may be described as 
"harassment" affects a ''term, condition, or privilege" of em-
ployment within the meaning of Title VII. See Rogers, 
supra, at 238 ("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet 
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not 
affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant 
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degree to violate Title VII); Henson, supra, at 904 (quoting 
same). For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be 
sufficiently severe or pervasive ''to alter the conditions of 
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working 
environment." Ibid. Respondent's allegations in this 
case-which include not only pervasive harassment but also 
criminal conduct of the most serious nature-are plainly suffi-
cient to state a claim for "hostile environment" sexual 
harassment. 
The question remains, however, whether the District 
Court's ultimate finding that respondent "was not the victim 
of sexual harassment," 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA), at 
43, effectively disposed of respondent's claim. The Court of 
Appeals recognized, we think correctly, that this ultimate 
finding was likely based on one of two erroneous views of the 
law. First, the District Court apparently believed that a 
claim for sexual harassment will not lie absent an economic 
effect on the complainant's employment. See ibid. ("It is 
without question that sexual harassment of female employees 
in which they are asked or required to submit to sexual de-
mands as a condition to obtain employment or to obtain pro-
motions falls within the protection of Title VII.") (emphasis 
added). Since it appears that the District Court made its 
findings without ever considering the "hostile environment" 
theory of sexual harassment, the Court of Appeals' decision 
to remand was correct. 
Second, the District Court's conclusion that no actionable 
harassment occurred might have rested on its earlier "find-
ing" that "[i]f [resp] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or 
sexual relationship . . . , that relationship was a voluntary 
one." I d., at 42. But the fact that sex-related conduct was 
"voluntary," in the sense that the complainant was not forced 
to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual ha-
rassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of 
any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual ad-
vances were "unwelcome." 29 CFR § 1604.11(a). While the 
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question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome 
presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on 
credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact, the 
District Court in this case erroneously focused on the "volun-
tariness" of respondent's participation in the claimed sexual 
episodes. The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her 
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were un-
welcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual inter-
course was voluntary. 
Petitioner contends that even if this case must be re-
manded to the District Court, the Court of Appeals erred in 
one of the terms of its remand. Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals stated that testimony about respondent's "dress and 
personal fantasies," 753 F. 2d, at 146, n. 36, which the Dis-
trict Court apparently admitted into evidence, "had no place 
in this litigation." Ibid. The apparent ground for this con-
clusion was that respondent's voluntariness vel non in sub-
mitting to Taylor's advances was immaterial to her sexual ha-
rassment claim. While "voluntariness" in the sense of 
consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that 
a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrele-
vant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she 
found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the con-
trary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC 
guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine 
the existence of sexual harassment in light of "the record as a 
whole" and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature 
of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged 
incidents occurred." 29 CFR § 1604.11(b). Respondent's 
claim that any marginal relevance of the evidence in question 
was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice is the 
sort of argument properly addressed to the District Court. 
In this case the District Court concluded that the evidence 
should be admitted, and the Court of Appeals' contrary con-
clusion was based upon the erroneous, categorical view that 
testimony about provocative dress and publicly expressed 
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sexual fantasies "had no place in this litigation." 753 F. 2d, 
at 146, n. 36. While the District Court must carefully weigh 
the applicable considerations in deciding whether to admit 
evidence of this kind, there is no per se rule against its 
admissibility. 
III 
Although the District Court concluded that respondent had 
not proved a violation of Title VII, it nevertheless went on to 
consider the question of the bank's liability. Finding that 
"the bank was without notice" of Taylor's alleged conduct, 
and that notice to Taylor was not the equivalent of notice to 
the bank, the court concluded that the bank therefore could 
not be held liable for Taylor's alleged actions. The Court of 
Appeals took the opposite view, holding that an employer is 
strictly liable for a hostile environment created by a supervi-
sor's sexual advances, even though the employer neither 
knew nor reasonably could have known of the alleged miscon-
duct. The court held that a supervisor, whether or not he 
possesses the authority to hire, fire, or promote, is necessar-
ily an "agent" of his employer for all Title VII purposes, since 
"even the appearance" of such authority may enable him to 
impose himself on his subordinates. 
The parties and amici suggest several different standards 
for employer liability. Respondent, not surprisingly, de-
fends the position of the Court of Appeals. Noting that Title 
VII's definition of "employer" includes any "agent" of the em-
ployer, she also argues that "so long as the circumstance is 
work-related, the supervisor is the employer and the em-
ployer is the supervisor." Brief for Respondent 27. Notice 
to Taylor that the advances were unwelcome, therefore, was 
notice to the bank. 
Petitioner argues that respondent's failure to use its estab-
lished grievance procedure, or to otherwise put it on notice of 
the alleged misconduct, insulates petitioner from liability for 
Taylor's wrongdoing. A contrary rule would be unfair, peti-
tioner argues, since in a hostile environment harassment case 
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the employer often will have no reason to know about, or 
opportunity to cure, the alleged wrongdoing. 
The EEOC, in its brief as amicus curiae, contends that 
courts formulating employer liability rules should draw from 
traditional agency principles. Examination of those princi-
ples has led the EEOC to the view that where a supervisor 
exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his em-
ployer, by making or threatening to make decisions affecting 
the employment status of his subordinates, such actions are 
properly imputed to the employer whose delegation of au-
thority empowered the supervisor to undertake them. Brief 
for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission as Amicus Curiae 22. Thus, the courts 
have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory 
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether 
or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved 
of the supervisor's actions. E. g., Anderson v. Methodist 
Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F. 2d 723, 725 (CA6 1972). 
The EEOC suggests that when a sexual harassment claim 
rests exclusively on a "hostile environment" theory, how-
ever, the usual basis for a finding of agency will often disap-
pear. In that case, the EEOC believes, agency principles 
lead to 
"a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment 
had reasonably available an avenue of complaint regard-
ing such harassment, and, if available and utilized, 
whether that procedure was reasonably responsive to 
the employee's complaint. If the employer has an ex-
pressed policy against sexual harassment and has imple-
mented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sex-
ual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take 
advantage of that procedure, the employer should be 
shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the 
sexually hostile environment (obtained, e. g., by the fil-
ing of a charge with the EEOC or a comparable state 
agency). In all other cases, the employer will be liable if 
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it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if, consider-
ing all the facts of the case, the victim in question had no 
reasonably available avenue for making his or her com-
plaint known to appropriate management officials." 
ld., at 26. 
As respondent points out, this suggested rule is in some ten-
sion with the EEOC guidelines, which hold an employer lia-
ble for the acts of its agents without regard to notice. 29 
CFR § 1604.11(c). The guidelines do require, however, an 
"examin[ation] of the circumstances of the particular employ-
ment relationship and the job functions performed by the in-
dividual in determining whether an individual acts in either a 
supervisory or agency capacity." Ibid. 
This debate over the appropriate standard for employer li-
ability has a rather abstract quality about it given the .state of 
the record in this case. We do not know at this stage 
whether Taylor made any sexual advances toward respond-
ent at all, let alone whether those advances were unwelcome, 
whether they were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a con-
dition of employment, or whether they were "so pervasive 
and so long continuing ... that the employer must have be-
come conscious of [them]," Taylor v. Jones, 653 F. 2d 1193, 
1197-1199 (CAB 1981) (holding employer liable for racially 
hostile working environment based on constructive 
knowledge). 
We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a defin-
itive rule on employer liability, but we do agree with the 
EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency princi-
ples for guidance in this area. While such common-law prin-
ciples may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title 
VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any 
"agent" of an employer, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), surely 
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employ-
ees for which employers under Title VII are to be held re-
sponsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in concluding that employers are always 
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automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervi-
sors. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§§ 219-237 (1958). For the same reason, absence of notice to 
an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from 
liability. Ibid. 
Finally, we reject petitioner's view that the mere existence 
of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, 
coupled with respondent's failure to invoke that procedure, 
must insulate petitioner from liability. While those facts are 
plainly relevant, the situation before us demonstrates why 
they are not necessarily dispositive. Petitioner's general 
nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassmen,t 
in particular, and thus does not alert employees to their em-
ployer's interest in correcting that form of discriminati<m.-
J. A. 25. Moreover, the bank's grievance procedure appar-
ently required an employee to complain first to her supervi-
sor, in this case Taylor. Since Taylor was the alleged perpe-
trator, it is not altogether surprising that respondent failed 
to invoke the procedure and report her grievance to him. 
Petitioner's contention that respondent's failure should insu-
late it from liability might be substantially stronger if its pro-
cedures were better calculated to encourage victims of ha-
rassment to come forward. 
IV 
In sum, we hold that a claim of "hostile environment" sex 
discrimination is actionable under Title VII, that the District 
Court's findings were insufficient to dispose of respondent's 
hostile environment claim, and that the District Court did not 
err in admitting testimony about respondent's sexually pro-
vocative speech and dress. As to employer liability, we con-
clude that the Court of Appeals was wrong to disregard 
agency principles and impose absolute liability on employers 
for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the circum-
stances of a particular case. 
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals revers-
ing the judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Dear Bill: 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 24, 1986 
Re: 84-1979 - Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 
Dear Bill: 
Although I agree with most of your draft opinion, I 
have serious reservations about the conclusion of Part III 
with respect to the employer's liability for the conduct of 
a supervisor. 
As I understand the cases, the Courts of Appeals are 
unanimous in holding that there is strict liability in the 
"quid pro quo" type of case, as in other Title VII cases, 
but the rule is less certain in a "hostile environment" type 
of case. It would seem to me to make a good deal of sense 
to have the same rule apply to both kinds of cases because 
as a matter of statutory construction, it seems doubtful 
that Congress would have intended different rules to apply 
to the two Title VII claims. I assume that there will be a 
good many situations in which the plaintiff's claims will 
involve a mixture of both. Moreover, in the hostile 
environment type of case, it would seem to me that normal 
principles of agency law would impose liability on the 
employer for conditions that fell squarely within the 
responsiblity of the supervisor. Accordingly, instead of 
leaving the issue in some doubt, I would favor giving our 
appro val to the rule that Courts of Appeals have pretty well 
already developed, namely that the employer is strictly 
liable for the conduct of the supervisor concerning the 
environment and the employees that are directly under his or 
her supervision. See e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 
599, 603-606 (CA7 1985). 
Apart from this concern, I am prepared to join your 
opinion. 
Justice Rehnquist 
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To:~~ -t;!:;_ April 26, 1986 
From: Bob 
No.84-1979 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 84-1979 
I have read Justice Rehnquist's draft, and think you could 
join it, although I share the reservations expressed in Justice 
Stevens' memo. I know that you were skeptical about the hostile 
environment claim here, but the circulating draft does no more 
than remand on that issue. 
I also agree, however, with the point made by Justice 
Stevens with respect to the liability issue. It is almost 
meaningless to say that the decision should be made according to 
agency principles. Note that there is no dispute in the area of 
guid pro guo discrimination that the employer is liable for the 
acts of the supervisor. Thus, we do not permit the employer to 
escape liability in this context by saying that firing for 
failure to submit to a sexual relationship was beyond the scope 
of the authority of the supervisor, and therefore the employer is 
not liable for the act. The employer is liable. I cannot 
understand why there would be a different rule in the "hostile 
environment" context. In addition, to deny liability in some 
cases of hostile environment means that certain charges would go 
without any effective remedy, since if the supervisor is found 
not to be acting as an "agent" he is not covered by Title VII. 
This would be a bad result because such logic would necessarily 
apply in the race context as well. Finally, there is another 
very good reason not to hopelessly complicate the scope of 
liability here, and that is that we are not talking about open-
ended, large monetary penalties for violations of Title VII; 
rather, we are simply talking about giving an employee who has 
been subjected to a hostile environment a meaningful remedy in 
the form of an injunction against the employer. 
Justice Rehnquist has indicated that he will make a sixth 
vote but not a fifth for the position on absolute employer 
liability. That must mean, at least, that he too sees the merit 
in it, but simply is not willing to make a Court on the issue. 
Thus, I think your position on the issue will be an important 
one. Were you to indicate agreement with the position taken by 
Justice Stevens, my guess is there would be a Court for employer 
liability for supervisors' conduct. That would be my preference. 
On the other hand you may simply want to join what Justice 
Reghnquist has circulated as you hinted was your preliminary 
inclination in our telephone discussion of 4/25. 
I do not recall specifically discussing this particular 
aspect of the case, thus your views may be very well set. 
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